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Abstract— Face de-identification algorithms have been devel-
oped in response to the prevalent use of public video recordings
and surveillance cameras. Here, we evaluated the success of
identity masking in the context of monitoring drivers as they
actively operate a motor vehicle. We studied the effectiveness of
eight de-identification algorithms using human perceivers and a
state-of-the-art deep convolutional neural network (CNN). We
used a standard face recognition experiment in which human
subjects studied high-resolution (studio-style) images to learn
driver identities. Subjects were tested subsequently on their
ability to recognize those identities in low-resolution videos
depicting the drivers operating a motor vehicle. The videos were
in either unmasked format, or were masked by one of the eight
de-identification algorithms. All masking algorithms lowered
identification accuracy substantially, relative to the unmasked
video. In all cases, identifications were made with stringent
decision criteria indicating the subjects had low confidence in
their decisions. We also examined the performance of the CNN
on identification. First, we tested identity matching between
the high-resolution images and templates created from both
the masked and unmasked videos. Next, we tested CNN on
matching identities between the high-resolution images and
masked videos, and between the unmasked and masked videos.
CNN performance on both tasks was comparable to human
behavior, including yielding different results across the mask
types. The results for both human and CNN indicated that
even simple methods such as edge-detection masking and
color inversion can greatly alter identification performance. We
propose that carefully tested de-identification approaches, used
alone or in combination, can be an effective tool for protecting
the privacy of individuals captured in videos. We note that no
approach is equally effective in masking all stimuli, and that
future work should examine possible methods for determining
the most effective mask per individual stimulus.
INTRODUCTION
Video recording technologies such as head-mounted de-
vices (e.g., Google Glass), cloud-based video surveillance,
body and dashboard cameras used by law enforcement
agencies, and civilian drones have emerged in both public
and private arenas. These technologies are often used without
the explicit consent or even awareness of the person being
recorded. It is, therefore, not surprising that the widespread
use of video surveillance has raised privacy concerns. As
such, there has been great interest in the development of
*K.O.H and A.B. contributed equally to this work.
de-identification algorithms in computer vision. These algo-
rithms typically have two objectives: 1) to effectively mask
the identity of individuals being recorded, thereby preserving
their privacy, and 2) to retain the important information for
which the recording was made.
Various algorithmic techniques have been employed in
the de-identification of still frontal face images in optimal
lighting conditions (e.g., ad-hoc distortion [1], [2] and k-
same [3]). However, these techniques are limited in their
ability to track and mask faces in dynamic video stimuli [4].
Recent work involving dynamic video stimuli has employed
approaches that cover motion detection without the need
for video decryption [5], data hiding [6], motion detection
followed by obfuscation [7], [8], foveation [9], singular value
decomposition [10], or full face/body de-identification using
segment replacement [11].
The continued challenge of these approaches is to main-
tain the integrity of the data being masked (e.g., expres-
sion/emotion/action preservation), while eliminating discrim-
inating cues about specific identity. As such, the tradeoff
between data preservation and de-identification has limited
the effectiveness of dynamic facial masking techniques.
Moreover, although high facial de-identification rates have
been achieved, those rates never reach 100%.
GOALS
In the present study, we address the question of de-
identification without consideration of the problem of data
preservation. We do this under the assumption that the latter
cannot be reasonably addressed until the former problem is
solved. This study is aimed at evaluating the effectiveness
of eight different identity masking algorithms, which we
apply to the Second Strategic Highway Research Program’s
Naturalistic Driving Study (SHRP2-NDS) video dataset [12].
Notably, we use the human perceptual system as a standard
of de-identification success, as well as a state-of-the-art deep
convolutional neural network (CNN). Specifically, we ask
whether a human and our selected CNN can recognize a face
that has been masked with a de-identification algorithm.
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BACKGROUND
A. SHRP2-Naturalistic Driving Study Data
The identity masking challenges posed by the SHRP2-
NDS dataset are nearly unique in their scale as well as in
the range of imaging conditions encompassed in the data.
The SHRP2-NDS dataset includes approximately 2 petabytes
of video footage from approximately 3, 400 drivers obtained
over 1 to 2 years of observation. However, the dynamic
video nature of the dataset provides for highly salient,
personally identifiable information about each of the drivers.
This information must be eliminated to allow for wider
distribution, examination, and analysis of the driving data
by various institutions with research interests in said data. In
particular, transportation researchers who have signed data
usage licenses would benefit greatly from access to masked
facial data, advancing the utility of the SHRP2-NDS to
answer important scientific questions about driver behavior.
Although much progress has been made in the field
of identity-masking, the naturalistic nature of the SHRP2-
NDS dataset poses difficult challenges to available de-
identification algorithms. The dataset is characterized by
extreme illumination conditions (e.g., night-time shadowing,
day-time bright spots, or illumination via transient headlights
as a car turns). There is also the problem of quick driver
movements (e.g., head turns and other actions which are very
common in real-world driving). Despite these challenges, the
research opportunities afforded by a dataset of this quality
are numerous and diverse. The need to make this dataset
available to researchers has motivated these de-identification
efforts and associated evaluations to assure masking success.
B. Identification using human perception
This work is a follow-up to a previous study [13] in
which the effectiveness of both identity disruption and action
preservation were measured using human evaluators. In that
study [13], de-identification success was examined for driver
videos taken from a research-available test set (the Virginia
Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI) Head Pose Validation,
HPV dataset) modeled on the SHRP2-NDS data. Specifi-
cally, in [13], the test was aimed at determining whether
human subjects could recognize drivers whose faces were
masked with one of two algorithms. The first algorithm was
the “personalized supervised bilinear regression method for
Facial Action Transfer (FAT)” [14]. The second algorithm
was an alternative edge-masking method used to “fill-in”
video frames in which the FAT mask failed to adequately
track and mask a driver’s face. Human performance accuracy
was measured by the signal detection measure of d’.
The human experimental data showed that both of the
algorithms substantially reduced the accuracy of human
identification of drivers [13]. These findings are generally
consistent with other studies that have used non-human eval-
uation methods of de-identification and masking algorithms
other than the FAT and edge-masking methods used by [13]
(cf., [15], [16], [17]).
Notably, the human performance data in [13] also in-
dicated that both of the masking algorithms greatly low-
ered human confidence in decisions about recognition (as
measured by C, a signal detection measure of response
bias). Specifically, both masking algorithms increased the
likelihood that subjects would respond that they “did not
recognize the driver”. Thus, although neither algorithm was
completely successful at eliminating the possibility of face
identification by human perceivers, recognition judgments
revealed a high degree of uncertainty. This is an important
result as it suggests that even successful identifications were
made with very low confidence.
The previous work provides a starting point for evaluating
identity masking success for the SHRP2-NDS dataset, but
leaves a number of important questions open for further
exploration. First, in [13], only two algorithms were eval-
uated. Here, we consider six additional masking methods.
This larger and more diverse set of algorithms offers a
more comprehensive evaluation of possible approaches to
de-identification of this challenging set of videos. Second,
because we focused here only on the identity masking
question, we were able to use videos that limited abrupt
driver motions (e.g., using a cell phone, checking rearview
mirror, head turn, etc). This eliminated the problems the
algorithms previously had with locating and tracking faces,
thereby assuring that the mask was correctly placed over the
drivers’ faces at all times. Lastly, in [13], the “studio style”
training images shown to subjects included peripheral cues
like hair and ears. Here, we eliminate these artifactual cues
to assure that identification is based only on the internal face.
C. Identification using CNN
For more than two decades, computer-based facial recog-
nition systems have been used by forensic face examiners
(e.g., passport controls and immigration visas) [18], com-
mercial technology (e.g., facial recognition based security
features on smartphones), advertising, and in healthcare
applications. Prior to 2013, facial recognition algorithms
were modeled on a variety of methods, such as Principal
Component Analysis (PCA), Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA), eigenfaces, and support vector machines [19], [20],
[21]. In the best cases, the performance of these algorithms
matched humans (cf. [22], [23], [24]), but only when the
tests were done with highly constrained, high-quality, studio-
style, frontal images of faces with limited changes in pose,
expression, and illumination [25], [26], [27], [28], [29].
Since then, algorithms based on CNNs have shown im-
pressive gains in face recognition accuracy on problems that
require generalization across substantial changes in image
characteristics. Inspired by the feed-forward hierarchical or-
ganization of the visual cortical areas of primates, CNNs con-
sist of cascaded layers of neuron-like units that convolve and
pool the data across the layers. CNNs are trained typically on
millions of images; for face recognition applications, these
images consist of thousands of face identities. The training
data often consist of unconstrained, low quality images with
substantial variations in pose, illumination, and expression
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[25], [30], [31], [32], [33]. The output is a compact numerical
feature vector that represents a face. This face descriptor
supports highly robust, accurate face recognition.
In this study, as a comparison for humans, we tested
whether a high-performing CNN ([34], [35]) could recognize
faces in the masked videos. The network we tested achieved
state-of-the-art results for both unconstrained face verifica-
tion and face recognition on the challenging IARPA JANUS
Benchmark-A (IJB-A) [36], IARPA-JANUS Benchmark-B
(IJB-B) [37], IARPA-JANUS Benchmark-C (IJB-C) [38],
and Labeled Face in the Wild (LFW) [39] datasets.
The contributions of the present work are as follows:
• We provide the first comparison of multiple masking
methods for face de-identification, using humans as the
standard of identification accuracy, as well as a state-
of-the-art CNN;
• We control for identification based on factors other than
the face (e.g., hair style, ear shape, etc.);
• We control for de-identification failures that might have
occurred due to inaccurate applications of the mask to
the face;
• We offer empirical validation of the use of the hu-
man perceiver as an evaluator for the success of de-
identification; and
• We provide a useful replication of the results of a pre-
vious study suggesting that single masking approaches
might be combined to more effectively mask faces of
different individuals.
I. EXPERIMENT I: EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF AUTOMATED IDENTITY MASKING (AIM) METHODS
WITH HUMAN PERCEPTION
In this experiment, we examined the success of various al-
gorithms at masking the identity of drivers in low-resolution
videos as they actively operated a motor vehicle. Human
observers were used to evaluate the performance of each
algorithm.
A. Methods
1) Dataset: As in [13], we used the VTTI-generated Head
Pose Validation (HPV) dataset of driver videos and still
images for this test. This dataset was developed for research
uses and does not have the same degree of privacy restrictions
as the SHRP2-NDS video dataset. The HPV dataset was ac-
quired using the same equipment as the SHRP2-NDS videos,
and therefore achieves comparable resolution, compression
rates, and illumination [40]. By closely simulating the quality
of the SHRP2-NDS data, the masking methods applied here
are assumed to be applicable to the full range of SHRP2-
NDS stimuli. Moreover, the data we report should generalize
well to the full SHRP2-NDS dataset.
The HPV dataset includes 41 high-resolution, front-facing,
color, still JPEG images of driver faces. The images were
tightly cropped around the face and placed on a black
background. Examples from a similar dataset are shown in
Figure 1. This cropping eliminated features such as ears, hair,
and some aspects of face shape as identification cues. The
original still image resolution for all drivers was 4320×3240
pixels. However, because the stimuli were cropped, variations
between individual drivers’ face width and height resulted
in image sizes ranging from 1331 to 1984 pixels in width
and 1324 to 2080 pixels in height. Note, however, that
standardizing the width/height of the cropped images would
have altered the quality of the images. Therefore, we left the
original aspect ratios intact.
Fig. 1. Examples of how the images used for training were cropped. For
confidentiality purposes, these are not actual stimuli used in the experiment
The HPV dataset also includes low-resolution (384× 259
pixels, 14.99FPS) videos of each driver actively driving a
car or performing staged activities commonly executed while
driving. Videos were shown either unmasked (face of the
driver was not altered) or masked with one of 8 masking
algorithms (description of algorithms follows).
Each video segment was 5s long. The segments for each
driver were identical between mask conditions to allow
for more direct comparison of mask effectiveness between
conditions. Because preservation of driving actions under
different mask conditions (e.g., using a cell phone, checking
rearview mirror, etc.) was not a critical research question in
the current study, driver motions and actions were limited
in these videos. This reduced movement assured that the
drivers’ faces were masked at all times. It also prevented the
mask algorithms from “losing” the drivers’ faces as a result
of too much motion. As such, unsuccesful identity masking
could not be attributed to the incorrect application of the
mask.
2) Automated Identity Masking Algorithms: In addition to
the FAT masking method used in [13] and described above,
we also examined the following masking conditions (Fig. 2).
• The DMask method [41] renders a generic avatar face
over any face detected in the video. This is achieved
by tracking and extracting eye gaze, face position, head
position, eye and mouth movement, and facial features,
in order to synthesize appropriate facial motion.
• The Canny method [42] performs a set of operations
designed to produce optimal edge detection, including
applications of a Gaussian smoothing filter, a set of
gradient-based edge detectors to enhance edges in the
image, then a non-maximum suppression, threshold, and
tracking to produce thin, refined edges.
• The Scharr method [43] performs a more fundamental
edge detection based on the Scharr operator, which
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filters the image to enhance edges and approximate the
image gradient.
• A combinatorial approach dubbed here the OverMask
method was employed by overlaying the Canny and
FAT methods.
• In addition, we used inverted color versions of the
Canny, Scharr, and OverMask methods.
Note that the FAT, OverMask, and DMASK methods
required a face and landmark detection phase, which was not
needed in the Canny and Scharr-based methods. As shown
in Fig. 2 (Mask conditions), the masking methods result in
different image outputs with potential differences in physical
perception for recognition. The implemented methods also
differ in processing time. Table 1 shows processing time us-
ing the default implementations with an Intel Xeon CPU E5-
1620 v3 R© 3.5GHZ with 64 GB RAM running the Windows
10 operating system.
TABLE I
DE-IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING TIME BY MASK ALGORITHM
Mask Condition Processing Rate Time (s)1
Scharr 30.06 1.2
Scharr-inverted 29.45 2.037
OverMask 2.27 26.49
OverMask-inverted 2.24 26.81
DMask 0.29 208.68
FAT 3.3 18.21
Canny 25.77 2.33
Canny-inverted 25.32 2.37
3) Procedure: The experiment was composed of a study
phase and a recognition phase. During the study phase,
subjects studied one of two Study Lists (A and B). Each list
contained high resolution, still images of half of the drivers.
This Study List variable was used as a counterbalancing
measure to assure that across all trials in the experiment, each
face would serve as a learned face and a test face an equal
number of times. Given the odd number of images, Study
List A contained 20 images, and Study List B contained
21 images. The driver images in each Study List were
presented in random order and were shown 4 times during
the study phase. Images were presented in the center of the
screen on a black background for 4 seconds with a 2-second
delay between each image presentation. No responses were
required from subjects during the training. Subjects were
instructed to study the pictures and were made aware that
they would be asked to recognize the faces in the second
phase of the experiment.
The subsequent recognition phase was conducted imme-
diately, during the same session, and with no significant
time lapse. Subjects were assigned randomly to one of 9
mask conditions corresponding to the 8 masked and one
unmasked condition. This latter served as a baseline for
general recognition success on the challenging task of rec-
1Time in seconds to process 60s of video data.
Fig. 2. Mask conditions. a. Unmasked; b. (left) FAT mask, (right) DMask; c.
(left) Canny, (right) Canny-inverted; d. (left) Scharr, (right) Scharr-inverted;
e. (left) OverMask, (right) OverMask-inverted
ognizing a person who is driving in a low-resolution video
after seeing a high-resolution still image of that person in
the study phase. Subjects were tested on the full set of 41
driver videos, with 20(21) familiar (i.e., studied) faces and
21(20) unfamiliar trials, depending on study list. Each subject
was tested with stimuli from one of the 9 mask conditions,
and the conditions were counterbalanced such that across all
subjects, all mask conditions were equally represented. All
videos were presented in the center of the screen on a black
background.
On each recognition trial, subjects were required to re-
spond as to whether they recognized the driver in the video
from the sequence of still images they had studied previously.
Subjects indicated their response by clicking a “YES” option
on the screen for a familiar identity, or by clicking “NEXT
VIDEO” for an unfamiliar identity. Subjects could replay the
videos as many times as they wished by pressing the SPACE
button on the keyboard.
4) Testing Apparatus: The experiment was conducted us-
ing Psychophysics Toolbox [44], [45], [46] in the MATLAB
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(v. R2014b) environment [47], thereby ensuring accurate
stimuli presentation times. Stimuli were presented on 21.5
inch iMac systems.
5) Participants: A total of 160 (125 female) undergrad-
uate student volunteers (ages 18-47) from the University of
Texas at Dallas participated in the study in exchange for
research credit.
B. Results
As in [13], Signal Detection Theory (SDT) was employed
to measure human accuracy and decision making. The SDT
model was formulated for each test trial as follows. Images
presented in the recognition test were either seen previously
(familiar) or were not seen previously (unfamiliar). A hit
was defined as a previously seen identity that was judged
correctly to be familiar. A false alarm was an identity not
previously seen that was incorrectly judged to be familiar.
1) Accuracy: Accuracy was assessed as d’, which was
calculated using the proportion of hits, p(hit), and the
proportion of false alarms, p(false alarm):
d′ = z(p(hit))− z(p(false alarm)),
where the z(.) is the z-score.
Due to the non-linearity of d’ for hit rates close to ceiling
and false alarm rates close to floor performance, we used
the Macmillan and Creelman [48] correction for p(hit) =
1 and p(false alarm) = 0. For those rates, the correction
was applied as follows. If p(hit) == 1, then substitute
p(hit) = 1 − 1/(2Nh), where Nh is the number of trials
in which a familiar identity was presented. Likewise, if
p(false alarm) == 0, then substitute p(false alarm) =
1/(2Nfa), where Nfa is the number of trials in which an
unfamiliar identity was presented.
Table 2 and Fig. 3 show the average d’ and standard
error of the mean (SEM) for each mask condition. These
values suggest that the faces in the Unmasked condition were
recognized well, and that recognition of faces in all of the
masked conditions was impaired substantially. We examine
the pattern of performance across conditions more formally
in Section B3.
TABLE II
RECOGNITION PERFORMANCE: AVERAGE d’ IN ASCENDING ORDER
Mask Condition Average d’ SEM2
DMASK 0.16 0.11
Canny 0.17 0.1
OverMask-inverted 0.23 0.12
Scharr 0.29 0.09
FAT 0.32 0.11
Canny-inverted 0.32 0.09
Scharr-inverted 0.5 0.11
OverMask 0.59 0.1
Unmasked 1.11 0.09
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Fig. 3. Average d’ by Mask Condition. Error bars are SEM.
2) Response Bias: Response bias was measured using the
signal detection criterion measure, C. C measures a subject’s
propensity to make a familiar versus unfamiliar response
when they are uncertain. The criterion was computed as:
C = −0.5× [z(p(hit)) + z(p(false alarm))]
This score is close to zero when subjects show no re-
sponse bias; it is positive when familiar judgments are made
conservatively; and it is negative when the same judgments
are made liberally. Table 3 and Fig. 4 report the average C
for all conditions. These values suggest that subjects made
all of their recognition judgments conservatively, even when
the test stimulus was not masked. We examine the pattern of
criteria across conditions more formally in Section B3.
TABLE III
RESPONSE BIAS: AVERAGE C
Mask Condition Average C SEM2
Unmasked 0.44 0.10
Scharr 0.41 0.09
Scharr-inverted 0.32 0.08
OverMask 0.27 0.09
OverMask-inverted 0.44 0.10
DMask 0.74 0.19
FAT 0.36 0.10
Canny 0.29 0.12
Canny-inverted 0.18 0.14
3) ANOVAs and SEM comparisons: A two-factor Analy-
sis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the accuracy (d’)
data, using Mask Condition and Study List as independent
variables. There was no effect of, or interaction with, the
Study List variable, and so we do not consider this variable
further. The resulting one-factor model yielded a main effect
of Mask Condition on d’, F (8, 142) = 9.04, p < 0.001.
2SEM is the standard error of the mean.
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Fig. 4. Average C by Mask Condition. Error bars are SEM.
In comparing among the conditions, the SEM values
indicate that the d’ accuracy was significantly higher in
the Unmasked condition than the masked conditions. This
indicates that all masks effectively impaired identification.
Among the masked conditions, the OverMask and Scharr-
inverted conditions produced significantly higher d’s than
the other masks indicating that they impaired identification
less than the other masks. The Scharr, OverMask-inverted,
DMask, FAT, Canny, and Canny-inverted conditions proved
equally effective at impairing identification (see Figure 3).
An analogous ANOVA was conducted for the response
bias C. The resulting one-factor model yielded no significant
main effects of Mask Condition on C, F (8, 142) = 1.79, p =
0.08 (see Figure 4). This indicates that response bias did
not differ across mask conditions (including the no-mask
condition).
Hits and false alarm rates are shown in Fig. 5. ANOVAs
were calculated separately on hit and false alarm rates. For
hit rates, there was a significant main effect of Mask Con-
dition, F (8, 142) = 3.12, p = 0.003, with the Unmasked,
Scharr-inverted, OverMask, and Canny-inverted conditions
yielding the best hit rates. These conditions did not differ
statistically from each other.
Notably, there was no hit rate advantage for the Unmasked
condition over the masked conditions, suggesting that the
accuracy advantage seen for the Unmasked condition, as
measured by d’, was due to a lower false alarm rate for
Unmasked videos. This explanation was formally verified
with an ANOVA on false alarm rate, which revealed a signif-
icant main effect of Mask Condition, F (8, 142) = 2.48, p =
0.015, and a false alarm advantage for the Unmasked videos
over the masked videos.
4) Summary: Human Recognition of Masked Faces: The
results indicate that all masks effectively impaired identifi-
cation. Among the masked conditions, the OverMask and
Scharr-inverted conditions were the least effective at impair-
ing identification. The remaining masks (Scharr, OverMask-
nverted, DMask, FAT, Canny, and Canny-inverted) all proved
equally effective. Notably, participants used conservative
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Fig. 5. Hit and false alarm rates by Mask Condition. Error bars are SEM.
criteria in all cases, indicating limited confidence in their
recognition judgments.
II. EXPERIMENT II: EVALUATING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF AUTOMATED IDENTITY MASKING
(AIM) METHODS WITH A DEEP CONVOLUTIONAL
NEURAL NETWORK (CNN)
Next, we tested the effectiveness of identity-masking
methods against identification by a state-of-the-art CNN
algorithm. The goal was to determine whether the network
could identify faces in the masked videos in two separate
simulations. Note that for the CNN, the task was analogous to
a perceptual matching task, whereby the algorithm compares
a masked and unmasked face to determine if the two videos
show the same person.
The following simulations were conducted:
(i) High-Resolution Images vs. Masked and Unmasked
Video Templates: This simulation involved comparing
identities in high-resolution still images with those
in low-resolution, masked and unmasked video frame
templates. The differences in resolution, pose, and illu-
mination between the still images and the video frames
presented an extra challenge to an already complex
task. To give the CNN the best chance, we created
video-identity templates by averaging the video frames
of each of the videos (see Methods).
(ii) Unmasked Video Templates vs. Masked Video Tem-
plates: To more closely address the challenges that
the resolution, pose, and illumination differences pre-
sented for the network, this simulation compared the
low-resolution, unmasked videos to the low-resolution,
masked videos. The masked and unmasked videos
were identical frame-by-frame, except for the mask
being applied to the face in the masked videos. This
keeps constant factors such as perspective, illumination,
trajectory of motion, etc. Although those factors might
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be represented by the network, they cannot provide
information useful for face identification, and so this
simulation provides a look at the importance of match-
ing image conditions in network accuracy.
A. Methods
1) Dataset: Similar to Experiment I, we used the same
driver videos and still high-resolution images. We also ex-
tracted still frames from the video epochs. For each video,
76 to 77 frames were extracted.
2) Deep Convolutional Neural Network: The network
[35] used the publicly available Face-ResNet architecture
[49] with the Universe dataset for training. Instead of using
the regular Softmax Loss, by introducing the Crystal Loss
(L2 Softmax) function during training, the network algorithm
restricts the features to lie on a hypersphere with a fixed
radius ([35]). The network consists of 101 layers with the
scale factor α of 50. The dimension of the penultimate layer
is 512 which forms the feature descriptor of an image.
3) Procedure: The high-resolution images and video
frames were submitted to the network [35]. The output for
each image/frame was a vector of 512 features exhibiting
the CNN’s representation of the image in a numerical form.
For each identity within a given Mask Condition, feature
vectors were averaged across one video to create a template
of a driver video. The cosine distance between these feature
templates was used as an indicator of similarity between the
templates of the drivers in masked and Unmasked conditions.
B. Results
For each driver, we computed the cosine similarity scores
between the feature descriptors in the high-resolution images
and the averaged feature templates of each Mask Condition.
Cosine similarity scores between the feature descriptors in
the high-resolution images and the averaged feature tem-
plates of each of the 9 Mask Conditions were used to indicate
the likelihood that the stimuli showed the same person.
Analogously, cosine similarity scores between the averaged
feature templates for the Unmasked and each of the 8 masked
conditions indicated how similar a face in a low-resolution
unmasked template was compared to its masked version.
Face recognition accuracy was measured using the Area
Under the receiver operating Characteristic (AUC). This
measure indicates how capable the algorithm was at distin-
guishing identities. An AUC of 0.5 indicates chance perfor-
mance, an AUC of 1.0 indicates perfect performance, and
an AUC of 0.0 indicates that all judgments were incorrect.
The AUC scores are shown in Table 4 and the corresponding
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves are plotted
in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7.
1) High-Resolution Images vs. Masked and Unmasked
Video Templates: First, we measured the CNN’s assessment
of similarity between the high-resolution images and their
corresponding video templates. The results are shown in Fig.
6 and Table IV. Performance accuracy of the network was the
highest when matching the identities in high-resolution im-
ages with their unmasked video counterparts (AUC = 0.99).
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Fig. 6. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for the high-
resolution images vs. the video templates from each of the 9 Mask
Conditions.
Network accuracy dropped when comparing high-resolution
images to the FAT, Over, Over-inverted, and Scharr-inverted
video templates (AUC = 0.8). Performance was at chance
when the network was comparing the high-resolution images
to the DMASK, Scharr, and Canny video templates (AUC
= 0.5). As noted, the Over and Over-inverted masks were
created by overlaying the FAT mask with the Canny and
Canny-inverted masks. Because the CNN considers only the
face, it was not surprising that network performance was
comparable for these three mask conditions. The results are
similar to those seen in the behavioral task: performance
was best matching high-resolution images to unmasked
videos/templates, and it suffered in all other comparison
conditions. In particular, both the humans and the algorithm
were at their worst when identifying drivers in the DMASK
and Canny conditions.
2) Unmasked Video Templates vs. Masked Video Tem-
plates: Next, we measured the CNN’s assessment of similar-
ity between the unmasked video templates and their masked
video template counterparts. The resulting ROC curves are
shown in Fig. 7. Here, network performance mirrors the
previous task of comparing high-resolution images to masked
video templates.
RESULTS SUMMARY
In Experiment I, face recognition accuracy for human
observers was impaired for all conditions in which the
face was masked, relative to the Unmasked condition. The
Scharr-inverted and OverMask conditions were the least
effective masks. The remaining masks (Scharr, OverMask-
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TABLE IV
AREA UNDER THE RECEIVER OPERATING CHARACTERISTIC (AUC) SCORES FOR THE HIGH-RESOLUTION IMAGES, UNMASKED VIDEO TEMPLATES,
AND MASKED VIDEO TEMPLATES.
High-Res Image Unmasked FAT DMASK Over Over-inverted Canny Canny-inverted Scharr Scharr-inverted
High-Res Image - 0.99 0.85 0.49 0.83 0.84 0.5 0.63 0.52 0.79
Unmasked 0.99 - 0.99 0.51 0.99 0.99 0.56 0.70 0.54 0.92
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Fig. 7. Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves for the each of
the unmasked video templates and their masked counterparts.
Inverted, DMask, FAT mask, Canny, and Canny-inverted)
proved highly effective in impairing recognition. Dissecting
recognition into hit and false alarm rates, it is clear that
recognition of the unmasked faces is highly accurate due to
both a high hit rate and a low false alarm rate. Response bias
was uniformly conservative and did not vary as a function
of Mask Condition.
In Experiment II, the performance accuracy of the net-
work for matching identities in the high-resolution images
to those in the unmasked video templates was at ceiling
(AUC = 0.99). This validates the efficiency of the CNN
despite the challenging nature of the task and the variations
in illumination, pose, resolution, and compression between
the high-resolution images and the video templates. The
ordering of the performance for the masks was roughly
comparable in both simulations (i.e., comparing between
high-resolution and video, and comparing between unmasked
video templates and masked video templates). Specifically,
the best performance was found for the FAT, Over-inverted,
Over, and Scharr-inverted masked video templates, followed
by the Canny-inverted condition. The lowest accuracy was
seen in the Canny, Scharr, and the DMask conditions. The
low accuracy observed in the DMask condition was not
surprising, as this mask is a generic avatar face mapped
on the face of the driver. However, the differences between
the Scharr/Scharr-inverted, and Canny/Canny-inverted condi-
tions are remarkable given the limited difference of inversion
between these condition pairs. Whereas performance accu-
racy in the Canny condition was at chance, accuracy was
substantially higher in the Canny-inverted condition (AUC
= 0.7). This trend is also evident between the Scharr and
Scharr-inverted conditions - a simple color inversion yields
higher accuracy.
In summary, the results for both human perceivers and
the CNN indicated that, compared to other mask conditions,
the DMask and Canny conditions were most successful at
impairing the network’s identification performance.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Our aims were: a.) to compare a variety of identity-
masking algorithms using human perception as the ultimate
standard of recognition performance; and b.) to test the
effectiveness of identity masking with a state-of-the-art CNN
for the same task. Our results show that the effectiveness
of identity masking varies as a function of mask condition
for both human observers and the CNN. Given the results
of both humans and machines, we speculate that the use
of a one-size-fits-all masking algorithm is perhaps not an
ideal approach to identity masking. In addition, the various
challenges posed in video stimuli (e.g., lighting, shadows,
movement, resolution, etc.) might be best overcome using a
combinatorial approach.
We also addressed questions that remained following
the work of [13]. First, we eliminated the possibility that
recognition could be based on information other than the
face. Specifically, we eliminated hair and ears as possible
cues to identity in the training images shown to human
observers. Second, we tested subjects only on stimuli in
which the mask was successful (i.e., eliminating short epochs
in the video where the face tracking algorithm failed due
to abrupt movements.) In the previous work [13], natural
movements of the drivers sometimes caused problems in
facial tracking, causing the mask to fail to adhere to the
face. The current research uses motion-limited video epochs
to eliminate this facial-tracking failure. Additionally, we used
a combinatorial masking method, the Overmask method,
which combines filtering and avatar approaches. Although
weaker at masking, filtering methods do not suffer from
8
tracking failures and so are not limited by abrupt motions.
Conversely, avatar-based methods are ineffective when the
mask misses the face center, but are highly effective when the
mask is properly placed. We note that combinatorial methods
such as Overmask may be a good option in less-controlled
stimulus sets, when abrupt motions are likely.
Third, participants’ confidence (C) in their identifications
was always above zero, indicating conservative response ten-
dencies for every mask condition. Human face identifications
made with weak confidence are not usually accorded strong
credibility. Combined, the present effects support the practice
of using data license agreements that specifically prohibit
attempts to re-identify the drivers, and they make a strong
case for the benefits of masking these data sets to improve
data access for transportation studies.
Fourth, we expanded the number of identity-masking algo-
rithms, comparing 8 algorithms based on diverse methods.
Although all of the masks impaired identification substan-
tially over the unmasked face, none of the masks completely
eliminated identifiability. In addition, differences in mask
effectiveness (as measured via d’) were observed between
the algorithms tested, including algorithms that were sim-
ply direct inversions of other algorithms. These differences
highlight the relative strength of different masks for different
video challenges.
Fifth, we added results from a subset of masking al-
gorithms tested using a state-of-the-art deep convolutional
neural network. Although no formal comparison between
CNN and human observer performance was made here, we
note that the overall behavioral results were corroborated by
the performance of the CNN in the second experiment.
Given our observations of CNN performance, future work
could evaluate the effectiveness of using CNNs to predict
which mask algorithms are better suited for certain stimuli.
This kind of stimulus-specific identity-masking could be the
next step in preserving privacy in an age of continuous video
surveillance.
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